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Abstract 
We estimate the effect of financial openness on economic integration for two clusters of 
countries: the formerly planned economies of Eastern Europe and central Asia (emerging 
market economies) and some western advanced economies. We focus on two dimensions of 
economic integration: convergence of per-capita incomes across countries and trade 
integration. We employ both single equation estimation and system estimation to account for 
endogenous links between trade integration and income convergence. Results show that in 
the cluster of emerging market economies, financial openness is a powerful instrument of 
economic integration. In the group of advanced economies, financial openness effectively 
facilitates income convergence, but its impact on trade integration is ambiguous.   
I. Introduction 
The steady expansion of financial flows across the borders and the rapid increase in the number 
of regional economic integration agreements are two of the most evident aspects of globalization in the 
1990s. The purpose of this paper is to study the link between the two. In particular, we estimate to 
what extent financial openness promotes regional economic integration in Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). We focus on two specific dimensions of the integration 
process: the convergence of per-capita incomes across countries in a regional cluster and the intensity 
of trade in goods and services between countries. With respect to financial openness, we separate 
between capital account liberalization and international financial integration. These two concepts have 
often been used interchangeably in the literature, but, in fact, they represent a mean-goal relationship.1 
Capital account liberalization is the process of lifting administrative or legal restrictions on capital 
movements, hence, creating the necessary conditions for the integration of the domestic financial 
system into the global market. International financial integration instead refers to the actual volume of 
capital flows that take place across the borders. Thus, financial openness is essential to achieve 
international financial integration, but the former does not necessarily lead to the latter. Operationally, 
the analysis in this paper will employ different proxies to measure international financial integration: 
(i) an index of capital account liberalization, and (ii) the volume of portfolio-based and equity-based 
capital flows.  
Several innovations characterize our study vis-à-vis the existing literature. First, most of the 
literature on the effects of financial openness (or financial integration) on economic performance 
essentially looks at economic growth.2 Instead this paper directly considers the income difference 
between richer and poorer countries in a regional cluster, thus assessing the differential impact of 
financial openness on the speed of catching-up. Moreover, in studying the contribution of financial 
openness to international trade, this paper extends the existing literature on trade empirics by 
considering variables not included in the gravity equations used in previous studies.3 
Second, specific attention is devoted to disentangling the effect of financial openness from that of 
domestic financial development. As the two phenomena are expected to be positively correlated, the 
variables used to proxy for financial openness might also capture the effect of domestic financial 
development on the economic performance. The consequence might be the overestimation of the 
                                                   
1 See, for instance, the discussions in De Brouwer (1999) and Le (2000). 
2 See Hali et al. (2004) for a survey. 
3 Rose (2004) surveys the variables and channels that are most often investigated in the literature on the macroeconomic 
determinants of international trade. 
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actual impact of financial openness. To address this problem, the econometric model will include 
indicators of the depth of domestic financial markets in addition to measures of financial openness.4 
Third, our investigation looks at two separate groups of countries: the formerly centrally planned 
economies (referred to as ‘emerging market economies’) and a cluster of western advanced economies. 
The estimates effectively indicate the existence of some significant differences between the two groups 
with respect to the structural channels linking financial openness and economic integration.   
Finally, relative to our latest research on this topic (Carmignani and Chowdhury, 2006), we 
explicitly take into account the endogenous relationship between the two dimensions of economic 
integration (trade and income convergence) by estimating a system of two (simulateneous) equations. 
We therefore let trade integration be a determinant of the speed of convergence and, at the same time, 
the income gap will be a determinant of trade intensities. A three stages least squares estimator will 
then be used to allow for non-zero covariances between the residuals of the two equations. 
The key results of the analysis can be summarized as follows. Financial openness significantly 
strengthens both income convergence and trade integration of the emerging market economies with the 
EU-15. These effects appear to work over and above any effect stemming from the development of 
domestic financial systems. In the case of advanced economies, however, the effect of financial 
openness on trade integration is almost negligible. Finally, system estimations confirm that deeper 
trade integration facilitates income convergence while faster convergence also promotes trade 
integration. This suggests that initially poorer and less integrated emerging market economies could 
fall into an ‘isolation trap’. For these economies, financial openness proves to be a powerful 
instrument to avoid marginalization. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly surveys the theoretical hypothesis 
on the impact of financial openness on the two dimensions of economic integration. Section III 
introduces the econometric methodology and explains the specification of the model. Section IV 
discusses the results. Section V concludes, drawing some policy implications and suggesting future 
lines of research. The appendix provides a full description of the variables used in the econometric 
analysis.  
II. Some theoretical background 
This paper evaluates the effect of financial openness on two dimensions of economic integration: 
international trade in goods and services and convergence of per-capita income across countries. The 
theoretical underpinnings of the analysis are spelled out in this section.5 
A. Financial openness and convergence of per-capita income.  
Economic growth theory provides the rationale for linking financial openness (and financial 
integration) to per-capita income. In both neo-classical and endogenous growth models, per-capita 
income at a generic time t is determined by technology and rates of accumulation of production factors 
(labour, physical and human capital).6 Several arguments have been proposed in the literature to show 
that financial openness has an impact on such determinants of per-capita income. 
One channel points to possible technological spillovers arising from capital account liberalization 
which spurs capital inflows and investments from abroad. Related arguments emphasise the spillovers 
eventually stemming from transfers of skills and increased competition. Another strand of research 
                                                   
4 Guiso et al. (2004) provides an in-depth analysis of the link between financial development and financial integration 
focusing on the EU countries. They claim that most of the growth pay-off from financial integration occurs through 
domestic financial development.  
5 This section draws on our previous work, Carmignani and Chowdhury (2006). 
6 For a formal treatment of the neo-classical model see Mankiw et al. (1992). For a review of models of endogenous growth 
see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995: chapters 4 and 5). 
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suggests that financial openness will broaden risk-sharing opportunities for domestic investors, thus 
reducing the cost of equity capital and increasing investment and the rate of capital accumulation. 
Moreover, better risk-sharing options will allow countries to shift their investment mix towards riskier, 
hence, higher-return projects. On a different ground, the political economy literature has pointed out 
the role of financial openness as a commitment technology device. When economic policies are 
dynamically inconsistent, capital account liberalization signals government’s intention to stick to 
macroeconomic and financial discipline. This, in turn, reduces economic uncertainty favouring longer-
term investment and factors accumulation. Finally, financial openness might be linked to income 
growth via the domestic financial system. In this view, lifting capital account restrictions promotes 
faster development of the domestic financial intermediation leading to a greater volume of credit being 
available to finance profitable projects as well as higher efficiency in the allocation of resources.7 
The central message of this literature is that financial openness positively correlates with per-
capita income (and with the rate of economic growth). Hence, the implication is that, if a country 
maintains capital account restrictions and limits the degree of international integration of its financial 
markets, it will then experience a widening gap in per capita income relative to a partner which is 
more financially open. That is, for a given level of financial openness of the partner country, the 
income gap between the partner country and the domestic country will be greater the lower the degree 
of financial openness of the domestic country. 
However, this prediction does not go unchallenged. Several models emphasise possible counter-
effects of financial openness on income which might, in turn, complicate the relationship between 
financial openness and income catching-up. If domestic institutions are weak, increasing financial 
openness will lead to a capital flight (even if the country is capital-scarce). This will hamper 
investment and hence long term growth prospects. Similarly, since the capital account is a channel of 
contagion in financial crises, its liberalization will make the country more vulnerable to speculative 
attacks, sudden stops and capital reversal, which are in turn all likely to have large negative output 
effects. Finally, informational asymmetries and/or pre-existing distortions (such as, trade restrictions) 
might well imply that foreign capital will be allocated inefficiently, for instance, going to sectors 
where the country has a comparative disadvantage.8 All of these counter-arguments, thus, point to the 
possibility that an increase in financial openness might in fact have perverse effects on the income gap 
of the domestic country relative to richer partners. 
B. Financial openness and international trade 
Assuming that internationally well integrated capital markets will effectively emerge from it, 
financial openness can influence the extent of international trade in goods and services through two 
main channels. The first operates through risk-sharing and production specialization.9 Consider a 
region where countries are affected by idiosyncratic shocks. If such shocks are large and volatile or, 
alternatively, if households are risk averse to a sufficient degree, then incentives to diversify domestic 
production will be stronger, thus, leading to low specialization. Open and well integrated financial 
markets facilitate the diversification of ownership. This, in turn, has two effects. First, if economic 
agents in one country hold debt and equity claims on the output of the other country, then the dividend, 
interest and rental income derived from these holdings contribute to smoothing shocks across 
                                                   
7 Bailliu (2000) proposes a simple formalization of several links between financial openness and growth within an AK 
setting. Bekaert and Lundblad (2001) and Henry (2003) discuss the effect of financial openness on the cost of capital. 
Obstfeld (1994) shows that financial openness, when resulting in capital market integration, supports risk-taking. Bartolini 
and Drazen (1997) examine the argument that capital account liberalization can work as a signal. 
8 See Boyd and Smith (1992) for a critique of the perverse effects of financial openness when domestic institutions are 
inefficient. A sceptical view of capital account liberalization based on various arguments is put forward by Rodrik (1998). 
The empirical literature also provides mixed evidence on the growth-effects of financial liberalization. For a broad 
assessment see Eichengreen (2001). 
9 For a discussion of the theoretical and empirical link between capital markets, risk sharing and production specialization 
see Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003). For more empirical evidence see Imbs (2003). 
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countries. This is, thus, a form of ex-ante international insurance. Second, to achieve consumption 
smoothing, households in each country will undertake ex-post adjustment of their asset portfolios 
following the realization of idiosyncratic shocks in the region. Again, this will lead to smoothing the 
income of all countries. Once insurance is available through international trade in financial assets, each 
country will have stronger incentive to specialize in one production (or technology) in order to fully 
exploit economies of scale (or technological competitive advantage). Specialization in production will 
then create greater scope for international trade in goods and services, as predicted from a standard 
neo-classical trade theory. 
The second channel relies on the ability of the financial sector to divert savings to the private 
sector. When domestic financial intermediation is weak and inefficient, firms in export-oriented 
sectors are burdened by significant liquidity constraints and hence trade less. Financial openness can 
help overcome those constraints by making more external finance available to domestic firms. An 
implication of this model is that international trade will tend to increase particularly in those sectors 
that more heavily rely on external finance, such as projects in the manufacturing sector. A related 
argument is that financial openness, by eventually facilitating the development of financial 
intermediation and, hence, contributing to the establishment of efficient systems of international 
payments, can work as a trade facilitation factor.10 
Overall, with respect to international trade, the prediction on the effects of financial openness is 
that countries that are more financially open should experience greater volumes of international trade; 
that is, financial openness should facilitate a country’s trade integration with any partner. 
III. Methodology and data 
Based on the discussion in Section II, the paper estimates two equations. One links financial 
openness to the difference in per-capita income across countries; the other links financial openness to a 
country’s international trade. Modelling strategy and estimation methodology are described below. 
A. Equation I: the income gap across countries 
The log of per-capita income y in country i at time t is assumed to be a function of K variables 
plus the degree of financial openness z (as suggested by the arguments reviewed in Section II): 
),,...,( ,,2,1 ititKititit zxxxfy =  (1) 
Let j be the partner country, then the income gap between i and j can be written as: 
))(),),...((),(( ,,,2,2,1,1 itjtitKjtKitjtitjtitjt zzxxxxxxfyy −−−−=−  (2) 
Denoting by d the difference between country j and country i (i.e., dx1,t = xjt – xit), equation (2) can 
be re-written in the more compact form: 
tKttttt dxdxdxdzdy εααααα ++++++= 4231210 ...  (3) 
                                                   
10 Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) provide a first formalization of the second channel. Further theoretical advances and some 
supporting empirical evidence are reported by Beck (2001). 
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where, α0 = cj – ci, εt is a normally distributed stochastic disturbance term, and the α’s are parameters 
to be estimated. Note that if α1 > 0, then the more country i falls behind country j in terms of financial 
openness, the larger the income-gap will be. This means that to reduce the income-gap, country i will 
have to increase its degree of financial openness for any given degree of financial openness achieved 
by the partner j. The role of financial openness in the process of per-capita income convergence can, 
thus, be tested through the null hypothesis H0: α1 = 0. 
The baseline specification of (3) includes the following regressors (expressed in difference 
between reference country j and country i: (i) the rate of labour accumulation (dn), (ii) the rate of 
human capital accumulation (dh), (iii) the depth of domestic financial intermediation (dq). The first 
two variables are standard, theory based, determinants of income per-capita11. The third one is 
included so as to disentangle the effect of financial openness on convergence from the effect of 
domestic financial development. The baseline will then be integrated by the rate of physical capital 
accumulation (dk) and an indicator of the quality of institutions (dIquality). 
B. Equation II: the gravity equation  
The second equation is a gravity model of bilateral trade. The gravity approach posits that the 
volume of trade between two partners is positively related to their economic size and inversely related 
to their distance. This approach has received wide empirical support, and recent studies have shown 
how it can be closely linked to formal theories of international trade.12 Therefore, it seems to be the 
most appropriate tool to test whether financial openness promotes trade integration. 
For a given year t, the gravity equation expresses trade of country i with the partner country j (Tij) 
as a function of the economic size of the two countries (Y), the geographical distance between them 
(D) and a set of additional geographical, economic and environmental variables W: 
)exp( ,
,
,,
, tij
tij
tjti
tij WD
YY
T =  (4) 
tijtijtjtitij WDYYT ,,,,, )ln()ln()ln( +−=  (5) 
Following the arguments presented in Section II, financial openness of country i (zi) will be 
included in the set W. Similarly to the specification of the per-capita income gap equation, a proxy for 
domestic financial depth in country i will also enter the r.h.s. so as to disentangle the effect of financial 
openness from that of financial development. Thus, the gravity equation to be estimated is: 
tijtititijtjtitij qzDYYT ,,4,3,2,,10, )ln()ln()ln( υβββββ +++++=  (6) 
where υ is a stochastic disturbance term, and β's are the parameters to be estimated. It goes without 
saying that, whilst formally indexed by the subscript t, distance D is constant over time. Again, the 
sign and statistical significance of the coefficient β3 will provide empirical evidence on the impact of 
financial openness on the degree of trade integration of country i with partner j. A statistically 
significant and positive value of β3 would indicate that financial openness promotes trade integration. 
                                                   
11 See Mankiw et al. (1992). 
12 For a discussion of gravity equations, see, inter alia, Evenett and Keller (2002). 
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Drawing on the gravity literature, equation (6) will be expanded by adding some dummy 
variables to the set W in order to isolate specific trade facilitating conditions. Furthermore, as recently 
shown by De Groot et al. (2003), ineffective institutions tend to increase transaction costs and 
therefore reduce trade. An indicator of institutional quality in country i (Iquality) will then be added to 
the set of regressors. 
C. Estimation methodology and data 
1. Sample and data 
Equations (3) and (6) are estimated on two groups of countries. The first group includes only 
formerly planned economies (so-called emerging market economies). The second group consists of 
advanced western economies. The sample covers the period 1990–2003.13 For each variable, 
convergence is measured relative to the EU-15 average. In other words, equations (3) and (6) are 
estimated using the EU-15 average as the reference partner j. This makes it possible to assess the effect 
of financial openness on the process of economic integration of country i with the EU-15. In fact, the 
main findings are qualitatively unchanged if the United States or the richest among EU-15 economies 
are used as reference partners. 
To operationalize equation (3), y is measured by a country’s real per-capita GDP; n is proxied by 
the fertility rate; h is proxied by the enrolment rate in tertiary schooling; k is proxied by the real 
investment share of GDP, and q is defined as a country's ratio of M2 minus narrow money to narrow 
money. In equation (6), instead, trade is measured by a country’s exports to, and imports from, the EU-
15 in logarithm of millions USD (tradeeu); Y is given by real aggregate GDP, and dst is the logarithm 
of distance (in kilometres) between the capital of a country and Frankfurt am Main. Finally, drawing 
on Henisz (2000), institutional quality Iquality is measured by an index of effectiveness of political 
and institutional constraints on policy changes. A complete list of variables, definitions and sources is 
given in the Appendix. 
Crucial to the estimation of equations (3) and (6) is the empirical definition of the variable z, the 
degree of financial openness. Previous studies have employed two types of proxies: indicators of 
capital account liberalization and measures of the actual volume of capital flows across countries. 
Since capital account liberalization and international financial integration constitute two distinct, albeit 
tightly correlated, concepts of financial openness, we make use of different indicators to capture the 
effect of both. 
A first suitable strategy, indeed rather common in the literature, is to construct an index of capital 
account liberalization using the information available from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAR).14 We follow the approach proposed by Chinn 
and Ito (2002) and construct our first proxy z1 as follows. 
From the AREAR we define for each country and each year four dummies: (i) R1 takes value 1 in 
the absence of multiple exchange rates; (ii) R2 takes value 1 if current account transactions are not 
restricted, and (iii) R3 takes value 1 if capital account transactions are not restricted; (iv) R4 takes value 
1 in the absence of a requirement of surrender of export proceeds. A variable SHARE3 is then 
constructed for each year as the average of R3 in that year and in the four preceding years. Finally, z is 
obtained for each country and each year as the first standardized principal component of R1, R2, 
                                                   
13 The panel is, however, unbalanced as for some countries the first available observation comes later than 1990. The group 
of emerging market economies includes: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian federation, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine. The group of advanced economies consists of: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA. 
14 See Miniane (2004) for a survey of various approaches adopted in the construction of such indices. 
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SHARE3 and R4. Thus, z1 is an indicator of overall cross-border capital liberalization: higher values 
denote greater financial openness. 
To measure the degree of international financial integration of country i instead we follow Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) and define the following two indices: 
it
itit
it GDP
FLFA
z
+=,2         and      
it
itititit
it GDP
FDILFDIAPELPEA
z
+++=,3  
where, as usual, i denotes a country and t a given year; FA is the stock of foreign assets; FL is the stock 
of foreign liabilities; PEA and PEL are the stocks of portfolio equity assets and liabilities respectively, 
and FDIA and FDIL are the stock of foreign direct investment assets and liabilities respectively. Thus, 
the variable z2 measures the overall volume of cross-holdings for a given country in a given year. The 
variable z3 measures instead the volume of cross-holdings in equity. 
2. Estimation methodology 
Two different estimation methods are used. With the first one (single equation estimation), each 
equation is estimated independently from the other. To account for reverse causality; that is, for the 
possibility that financial openness is determined by trade volumes and per-capita income growth, two 
stages weighted least squares (2SLS) are applied, using lagged and initial values of endogenous 
variables as instruments. The estimator is then further corrected to account for the fact that the annual 
panel is unbalanced.15 
The second method (system estimation) allows for non-zero covariances between the residuals of 
the two equations. Open economy growth models indicate that trade integration is likely to speed up-
convergence16. To account for this effect, the income-gap equation should then include bilateral trade 
between the country and the EU-15 among the regressors. Since bilateral trade is the dependent 
variable of the gravity model, we can gain in efficiency by estimating the two equations as a system 
through three stages least squares (3SLS). Again, endogenous variables are instrumented by their 
lagged values.   
IV. Econometric results 
A. Financial openness and per-capita income-gaps 
The results for the income gap equation (dy is the dependent variable) are reported in table 1. The 
estimates for the group of emerging market economies are shown in columns I to V; the estimates for 
the full sample of western economies are displayed in columns VI to X. 
To start with emerging market economies, the baseline specification in column I clearly indicates 
that a larger gap in financial openness (greater values of dz1) implies a greater income gap (dy). Thus, 
the less financially open an emerging market economy is relative to the EU-15 average, the more 
difficult it will be for this economy to catch-up with the EU-15. This effect holds over and above any 
difference in financial depth (dq), human capital accumulation (ds), and demographic dynamics (dn). 
Columns II and III show the same baseline equation re-estimated with measures of international 
                                                   
15 The unbalanced panel estimator follows Verbeek and Nijman (1996). An alternative to the 2SLS instrumental variable 
estimator would be a 3SLS system estimator (see Wooldridge 2002). In this case, equations (3) and (6) are estimated as a 
system together with an equation where financial openness is the dependent variable and trade and per-capita income 
enter as explanatory variables. In fact, a set of estimates from the 3SLS procedure are available from the authors upon 
request. The qualitative thrust of results does not change relative to the single-equation 2SLS presented in the next 
section. We prefer reporting the 2SLS and not the 3SLS because the focus of this analysis is more on the estimation of 
reduced-form equations than on structural models. 
16 Ben David (1996) provides evidence of income convergence among major trade-partners.  
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financial integration (dz2 and dz3). The evidence is complementary to that in column I: countries that 
fall behind the EU-15 average in terms of their degree of international financial integration tend to 
experience greater income gaps. In column IV the baseline specification is augmented by differences 
in physical capital accumulation, dk. The strength and statistical significance of dz1 are not 
substantially modified. This suggests that the mechanism through which differences in the degree of 
financial openness affect income convergence with the EU-15 does not work through the rate of 
investment. Interestingly, dq also does not lose significance when dk is added to the model. The 
interpretation is that the different stage of financial development matters not much because it 
determines different rates of capital accumulation, but because it implies a different level of allocative 
efficiency. Finally, the model in column V includes the indicator of institutional quality dIquality. In 
broad terms, dz1 still plays its role, while domestic financial depth becomes insignificant. As a matter 
of fact, the estimated coefficient of dIquality could, to some extent, already capture the contribution of 
dq to the determinantion of the income gap. Indeed, the development of the domestic financial system 
heavily relies upon the establishment of efficient institutions to protect economic rights. It then follows 
that the two variables dIquality and dq might be representing partially overlapping effects on dy and 
hence they might be collinear.  
Turning to the group of western economies, the basic result concerning financial openness seems 
to be confirmed. In all specifications, dz is positive and statistically different from zero, irrespective of 
the three proxies used. At the same time, dq always fails to pass a zero restriction test. This lack of 
effect of domestic financial depth, together with the equally negligibe role played by dk, is probably 
the most striking change relative to emerging market estimates. In fact, column X of the table seems to 
suggest that in advanced economies, the income gap dy is a function only of differences in institutional 
quality and in financial openness.  
Various robustness checks have been performed to test the sensitivity of the results. First, to test 
for the impact of ‘absolute’ rather than ‘relative’ financial openness, the income-gap equation has been 
re-estimated using country i’s level of financial openness (z) rather than the difference between the 
EU-15 and country i (dz). Similarly, dq has been replaced by q. In the basic specification without dk, 
the estimated coefficient on z turns out to be –0.121 (significant at 1 per cent) for the emerging market 
economies and –0.234 (significant at 1 per cent) for the western advanced economies. This means that, 
as expected, countries that are more financially open in absolute terms tend to experience smaller per-
capita income gaps vis-à-vis the EU-15 average.  
Second, different proxies for human capital accumulation and labour force growth have been tried 
(e.g., enrolment in secondary rather than tertiary school, population growth rather than fertility rate). 
Similarly, different indicators of the depth of domestic financial intermediation have been considered 
(e.g., the M2 to GDP ratio and the domestic credit to the private sector to GDP ratio). In general, the 
coefficient on dz always retains its sign and level of statistical significance. 
B. Financial openness and trade in goods and services 
Estimates of the gravity equation (6) are presented in table 2 (tradeeu is the dependent variable). 
As before, columns I to V refer to estimates for the group of emerging economies; columns VI to X 
refer to estimates for the group of western countries. 
All variables in the baseline specification estimated for emerging market economies exhibit 
highly significant coefficients with the expected sign. Trade flows between a country and the EU-15 
increase the larger the economic size of the country and the geographically closer the country is to the 
EU-15. Financial openness stimulates trade integration. Again, this effect is present over and above the 
positive impact on trade of a more developed domestic financial system. Using different proxies for 
financial openness (columns II and III) and introducing dummy variables to account for landlockedness 
and common borders (column IV) does not change the results. In line with the findings of De Groot et al. 
(2003), we also find (column V) that better institutions help trade integration with the EU-15. However, 
this effect adds to, instead of replacing, the effect of the financial variables q and z.  
9 
An intriguing pattern emerges from the sample of western economies. When measured by the 
Chinn and Ito’s index of capital account liberalization, financial openness does not appear to play any 
significant role in the gravity model. However, when proxies of international financial integration are 
used, the effect of financial openness becomes strongly significant and positive. To some extent, the 
lack of statistical significance of z1 might be due to the limited variability that this indicator has in the 
sample of advanced economies. On the contrary actual capital flows display greater variability both 
across countries and over time. This makes the estimation of the coefficients of z2 and z3 more precise. 
Another difference relative to the emerging market economies concerns landlocked countries. In the 
group of western economies, apparently, being landlocked does not cause economic marginalization. 
Finally, it is worth noting the marginally insignificant contribution of institutional quality to trade 
integration in this group of countries. 
Robustness checks analogous to those performed for equation (3) are carried out for the gravity 
model (i.e. changes in the definition of q and inclusion of additional variables on the r.h.s. of the 
model). Of some specific interest is the inclusion of a dummy variable to control for the existence of 
preferential trade agreement between a country and the EU-15. This dummy turns out to have a large 
and positive coefficient. Furthermore, the variable dst, distance, has been recomputed using different 
cities as the EU-15 reference. Overall, results on financial openness are qualitatively unchanged. 
C. System estimates 
If trade integration facilitates income convergence, then equation (3) has to be extended with the 
inclusion of tradeeu on the r.h.s. However, since tradeeu is the dependent variable of equation (6), 
some efficiency gain in estimation can be obtained by applying a 3SLS system estimator that allows 
for correlation of residuals across the two equations. Equations (3) and (6) are thus estimated as a 
system. These estimates are reported in table 3. As usual, we separate the group of emerging market 
economies (columns I to V) from the group of western economies (columns VI to X). Financial 
openness is always measured by Chinn and Ito’s indicator of capital account liberalization. Results 
obtained by using the other two proxies are not different from those discussed below and they can be 
obtained from the authors upon request. 
Column I combines the two baselines specifications, with the inclusion of tradeeu in the income-
gap equation. Qualitatively, results are not different from those obtained from the single equation 
2SLS squares. In particular, financial openness still plays its important role in determining economic 
integration: (i) a less financially open economy (relative to the EU-15 average) will experience a wider 
gap in per-capita incomes relative to the EU-15 and (ii) a less financially open economy will trade less 
with the EU-15. Since tradeeu turns out to reduce dy, then the trade-enhancing effect of financial 
openness feeds back on income convergence trhough tradeeu. We can thus conclude that financial 
openness affects the speed of convergence through two channels: a direct effect, captured by the 
positive coefficient of dz1 in the income-gap equation, and an indirect effect, captured by the positive 
coefficient of z1 in the gravity equation combined with the negative coefficient of tradeeu in the 
income-gap equation. 
Columns II through IV expand the baseline specifications in line with what was described in 
subsections IV.A and IV.B. The key findings concerning the role of financial openness are all 
confirmed. In the income gap equation, the variable dk has a positive and significant coefficient, while 
both financial variables dq and dz1 remain significant. This confirms the previous findings that 
differences in financial openness and in domestic financial depth do not affect the income gap through 
the investment rate. Greater allocative efficiency is a plausible transmission channel. In addition, one 
can think of transmission through increased policy discipline. The liberalization of international capital 
flows as well as the existence of more efficient financial intermediaries can put pressure on authorities 
to stabilize and improve the macroeconomic framework, which would in turn foster a more rapid 
catching-up.  
Differently from single equation estimates, instead, the dummy variables in the gravity equation 
are statistically significant only when the income-gap equation includes dk. Institutional quality also 
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fails to be significant both in the gravity equation and in the income gap equation. It would be 
desirable in future work to focus more on the causes that determine these differences between single 
equation and system equation estimates. A final note concerns the coefficient of population growth dn 
in the income gap equation. While in single equation estimates this coefficient displayed some 
instability, in the system estimates it is always negative, as expected from the neo-classical theory of 
growth, and different from zero. 
Column V proposes a fully endogenous model, with the income gap dy that enters the gravity 
model. That is, each of the two dependant variables now figures as regressor in the other equation. The 
results on all other variables are unchanged, at the same time dy exhibits a negative coefficient in the 
gravity equation. Thus, poorer countries tend to trade less with the EU-15 than richer countries. The 
endogenous relation between trade integration and income gap may lead to an ‘isolation trap’: countries 
whose per-capita GDP is significantly below the EU-15 average tend to trade less with the EU-15, but 
weaker trade integration reduces the speed of catching-up, so that the country is trapped in an 
equilibrium characterized by low-integration with the EU-15. Our results suggest that financial openness 
is a way to break this vicious circle. By opening more to international capital flows, initially poorer 
emerging market economies can catch-up faster and at the same time trade more with the EU-15.  
Estimates on the sample of western advanced economies point to a more ambiguous role of 
financial openness. While the coefficient of dz1 is always positive and significant in the income gap 
equation, the contribution of z to trade integration is negligible or even negative. Therefore, an increase 
in financial openness relative to the average of EU-15 has different effects on different dimensions of 
the integration process. The negative trade effect of the income gap is confirmed. However, there is no 
evidence of ‘isolation trap’ for western advanced economies, since tradeeu does not significantly feed 
back on income gap. Institutional quality now matters: dIqual increases dy while Iqual increases trade. 
Institutional reforms are thus a key factor fostering the economic integration of western economies.  
V. Conclusions and directions of future research 
The main result of the empirical analysis is that financial openness facilitates the economic 
integration of emerging market economies with the EU-15. This integration effect takes the form of 
faster per-capita income catching-up and greater bilateral trade in goods and services. Furthermore, the 
effect of financial openness occurs over and above the effect of domestic financial deepening. Since 
system estimates show that trade integration feeds back on the income gap and, at the same time, the 
income gap reduces trade integration, financial openness is a powerfull instrument through which 
initially poorer and less integrated countries can overcome their marginalization. Thus our results add 
to the literature on the benefits of capital account liberalization.  
However, a number of qualifications are necessary. First, with respect to per capita income 
convergence, the regressions show that even if a country were to achieve the same degree of financial 
openness as the EU-15, the gap in per-capita income levels would persist as long as there are 
differences in technology and in the rates of factors accumulation, particularly human capital 
accumulation. Therefore, financial liberalization is only one of the several policies that countries need 
to implement in order to sustain income catching-up. Similarly, with respect to international trade, the 
empirical evidence indicates that financial openness ought to be embedded in a broader context of 
policies for trade facilitation, including the abatement of tariff and non-tariff barriers (e.g., inefficient 
custom procedures, inadequate transport infrastructures). Furthermore, some ambiguity on the role of 
financial openness exists in the case of more advanced western economies. In particular, for these 
countries there is evidence that reducing the financial openness gap with the EU-15 alse reduces the 
income gap, but the effect of greater capital account liberalization on trade is negligible and might 
even be negative. 
Possibly, the most crucial qualification of all concerns the possible side-effects and downward 
risks of financial openness. While our empirical analysis emphasises the benefits of free international 
capital movements for the process of economic integration, the experience of several other emerging 
economies world-wide calls for a careful design and implementation of financial and capital account 
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liberalization in the formerly centrally planned economies.17 The increased economic vulnerability that 
is associated with integration into global financial links needs to be managed by combining capital 
account liberalization with: (i) domestic financial sector reforms to strengthen regulation and 
supervision, enforce sound and prudential lending practices, achieve high-standards of governance of 
banks and other financial institutions; (ii) trade policy and competition policy reforms to eradicate 
distortions that financial openness might exacerbate; (iii) implementation of a coherent 
macroeconomic policy mix characterized by low inflation and fiscal stability, and (iv) design of 
redistributive tools to shield the most vulnerable socio-economic groups against the potential damages 
of increased volatility. Finally, in the transition towards financial liberalization, temporary and market-
based capital controls might eventually be considered to tilt the composition of inflows towards longer 
term maturities and so prevent a maturity mismatch between investment projects and financing.18 
A number of issues deserve investigation in future research. One concerns a better understanding 
of the channels through which financial openness affects per-capita income catching up. Several 
theoretical possibilities exist, and our empirical analysis indicates that financial openness does not 
produce its impact only through the development of domestic financial systems and a faster 
accumulation of physical capital. A more structural model is therefore needed to evaluate other 
possible mechanisms, such as allocative efficiency and policy discipline. Future work should also 
consider whether, in addition to the two considered in this paper, financial openness affects other 
dimensions of economic integration, such as the sustainability of fixed exchange rate regimes and 
macroeconomic policies convergence. Finally, our estimates point to a difference between emerging 
market economies and advanced western economis in the contribution of financial openness to 
economic integration. On the one hand, this difference should not come as a surprise since the two 
groups of countries are still characterized by some sharp differences in economic structures. On the 
other hand, they suggest that the research should be expanded to examine other clusters of countries in 
order to establish the structural conditions under which financial openness is more (or less) favourable 
to economic integration. This requires re-estimating equations like (3) and (6) on samples of countries 
selected along different criteria (i.e. membership in a given regional economic community, initial level 
of per capita income, etc.) and then comparing the estimated strength of the relationship between 
financial openness and economic integration dimensions across clusters. 
                                                   
17 See, i.e. the discussion in Johnston et al. (1997), Dailami (2000) and Daianu and Vranceanu (2002). 
18 Successful experiences with those type of controls are reported for Chile and other Latin American and East Asian 
economies. See, inter alia, Edwards (2002) and World Bank (2000). 
  
Table 1: Income gap equation 
 Emerging market economies Western economies 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
constant 1.112*** 0.807*** 0.401 1.724*** 1.205*** 0.011 -0.083*** -0.005 0.013 -0.020 
dq 0.706*** 0.709*** 0.559*** 0.813*** 0.211 -0.038 0.016 0.059 -0.031 -0.010 
dz1 0.126***   0.150*** 0.083** 0.258***   0.264*** 0.265*** 
ds 2.352*** 3.131*** 3.769*** 1.125*** 1.976*** 0.252** 0.015 0.336** 0.264** 0.010 
dn -3.488 -17.142 27.575 -27.881*** 33.045*** 12.675*** -17.153*** -7.659 13.134*** 5.923 
dz2  0.002***     0.001***    
dz3   0.007***     0.002***   
dk    1.441***     -0.108  
dIqual     0.092*     0.068*** 
N. 
Obs 110 66 55 109 96 189 138 110 188 185 
Note: Dependant variable is the difference between log average real per-capita income in the European Union and country’s log real per-capita 
income (dy). Estimation is by weighted two stages least squares. *,**,*** denote statistical significance of estimated coefficient at 1%,5% and 10% 
confidence level. See appendix for details on variables definition. 
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Table 2: Gravity equation 
 Emerging market economies Western economies 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
constant -36.664*** -31.852*** -31.203*** -34.902*** -32.689*** -24.173*** -21.581*** -22.164 -25.926*** -25.182*** 
q 0.252*** 0.192*** 0.165*** 0.221*** 0.175*** -0.128*** -0.154*** -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.042** 
z1 0.167***   0.164*** 0.115*** -0.001   0.000 0.000 
dst -0.862*** -0.678*** -0.517*** -0.886*** -0.780*** -0.254*** -0.201*** -0.431*** -0.109*** -0.107*** 
YY 0.971*** 0.854*** 0.825*** 0.943*** 0.884*** 0.696*** 0.639*** 0.673*** 0.690*** 0.675*** 
z2  0.003***     0.001***    
z3   0.014***     0.001***   
border    0.117*** 0.168***    0.847*** 0.813*** 
Llock    -0.140*** -0.171***    0.256*** 0.216*** 
Iqual     0.073***     0.006 
N. Obs 139 110 92 139 114 311 216 174 311 279 
Note: Dependant variable is log trade between country and the European Union (tradeeu). Estimation is by weighted two stages least squares. 
*,**,*** denote statistical significance of estimated coefficient at 1%,5% and 10% confidence level. See appendix for details on variables definition. 
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Table 3: System estimation 
 Emerging market economies Western economies 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
Equation 1: dependent variable dy 
constant 4.766*** 4.721*** 4.403*** 5.122*** 4.719*** 0.249 0.383 0.211 0.008 0.413 
dz 0.088** 0.093*** 0.103*** 0.105** 0.088** 0.223*** 0.222*** 0.236*** 0.245*** 0.213*** 
dq 0.288*** 0.300*** 0.468*** 0.325*** 0.320*** -0.030 -0.031 -0.031 -0.014 -0.020 
dn -14.633*** -14.507*** -27.087*** -17.924** -17.905*** 14.472*** 14.830*** 14.439*** 7.338 12.113** 
ds 1.340*** 1.379*** 0.965*** 1.349*** 1.381*** 0.577** 0.480** 0.336 0.053 0.488* 
tradeeu -0.349*** -0.347*** -0.284*** -0.392*** -0.344*** -0.021 -0.033 -0.018 -0.001 -0.036 
dk   0.913***     -0.305   
dIqual    -0.029     0.075***  
Equation 2: dependent variable tradeeu 
constant -35.767*** -34.861*** -35.271*** -32.415*** -28.605*** -21.944*** -24.185*** -24.393*** -23.527*** -23.251***
q 0.245*** 0.189*** 0.194*** 0.053 0.128** -0.177*** -0.090** -0.086* -0.074 -0.029 
z 0.223*** 0.221*** 0.224*** 0.152*** 0.163*** 0.062* 0.031 0.028 0.019 -0.075** 
dst -0.843*** -0.834*** -0.809*** -0.681*** -0.305** -0.219*** -0.146*** -0.144*** -0.140*** -0.121*** 
YY 0.952*** 0.937*** 0.941*** 0.872*** 0.777*** 0.652*** 0.667*** 0.670*** 0.647*** 0.645*** 
Border  0.156 0.143 0.124*** 0.190**  0.651*** 0.662*** 0.067*** 0.734*** 
Landl  -0.052 -0.051 0.287** 0.017  0.282*** 0.256** 0.691*** -0.001 
Iqual    -0.150     0.280***  
dy     -0.624***     -0.735*** 
N. Obs. 230 230 228 198 230 393 393 392 374 393 
Note: Estimation is by three stages least squares. *,**,*** denote statistical significance of estimated coefficient at 1%,5% and 10% confidence 
level. See appendix for details on variables definition. 
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VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
Variables Definition Source 
Dy Per-capita income gap. Difference between EU average log per-
capita income and country's log per-capita income 
WDI 
Dn Difference between EU average log fertility rate and country's log 
fertility rate 
WDI 
Dh Difference between EU average tertiary school enrolment rate 
and country's tertiary school enrolment rate 
WDI 
Dk Difference between EU average real investment share of GDP 
and country's real investment share of GDP 
WDI and PWT 
Q Index of domestic financial development: country's ratio of liquid 
liabilities to narrow money. Alternative definitions used for 
sensitivity analysis: domestic credit to private sector to GD ratio 
and liquid liabilities to GDP ratio. 
IFS 
Iqual Indexs of intensity/effectiveness of political and institutional 
constraints on policy changes. 
Henisz (200) 
Dq Difference between EU average q and country's q IFS 
Tradeeu Log of country's exports to and imports from EU.  DoTS 
YiYj Log of country's aggregate GDP times EU's aggregate GDP WDI 
Locked Dummy variable taking value if country is landlocked CIA World Factbook 
Border Dummy variable taking value 1 if country shares a land border 
with any EU-15 member 
CIA World Factbook 
Dst Log of distance (in km) between country and Frankfurt am Main CIA World Factbook 
z1 Index of capital account openness See Section III 
z2,, z3 Index of international financial integration. Two versions are 
proposed: p1 and p2  
See Section III 
Dz Difference between EU average open and country's open  
Dp Difference between EU average integr and country's p. Two 
versions are computed: dp1 uses p1 and dp2 uses p2. 
 
dIqual Difference between EU average value of check and country’s 
check 
 
Notes:  WDI is World Development Indicators Database 2004, World Bank;  
IFS is International Financial Statistics Database June 2004, IMF;  
PWT is Heston A., Summers L., and Aten B. Penn World Tables Version 6, CICUP, October 2002;  
DoTS is Direction of Trade Statistics 2004, IMF. 
 Henisz W. (2000). The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth. Economics and Politics, 1-31. 
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